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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4, as amended
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless
specifically provided, shall be construed as
an admission or denial of liability or
responsibility insofar as governmental
entities or their employees are concerned. If
immunity from suit is waived by this chapter,
consent to be sued is granted and liability
of the entity shall be determined as if the
entity were a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed as adversely affecting any immunity
from suit which a governmental entity or
employee may otherwise assert under state or
federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity
or its employee for an injury caused by an act
or omission which occurs during the
-iii-

9

performance of such employee's duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority isr after the effective date of this
act, exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject
matter against the employee or the estate of
the employee whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim, unless the employee acted or
failed to act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act or omission
complained of is one for which the
governmental entity may be liable, but no
employee may be held personally liable for
acts or omissions occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within
the scope of employment or under color of
authority, unless it is established that the
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud
or malice.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j), as amended
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury: ...
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county, or city
jail or other place of legal confinement; or

iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RONALD DEAN LANCASTER,

*

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

vs.

s

UTAH STATE PRISON, et al.f

:

Defendants-Respondents.

Case No. 86-0266

Priority No. 14

:

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF TBE CASE
Plaintiff's complaint, alleging that he was injured due
to the negligence and gross negligence of these defendants, was
dismissed pursuant to the state defendants' motion to dismiss, in
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding.

The only

remaining defendant, Savogran Company, was never served in this
action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff, an inmate lawfully incarcerated at the

Utah State Prison, alleges that he was injured in a fire that
occurred at the Utah State Prison on May 21, 1984. Complaint at
para. 7 and 8.
2.

Plaintiff alleged that the state defendants (Utah

State Prison, Eldon Barnes, Robert Steele, Betty Johnson and Dale
Johnson) had been grossly negligent in their conduct and that such
conduct was the proximate cause of the fire that injured the
plaintiff.

Complaint at para. 8-10.

3.

The Defendant Savogran Company was never served

summons in this matter.

The only defendants served were the above

named state defendants.
4.

State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on

January 21f 1986.

State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and

accompanying Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.
5.

Plaintiffr through counsel, filed an objection with

accompanying memorandum in opposition to the State Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

Objection to State Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to
State Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss.
6.

At a hearing, before Judge Rigtrup, on April 28,

1986, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was argued and
granted.

Judge Rigtrup ordered that Defendants Utah State Prison,

Eldon Barnes, Robert Steele, Betty Johnson and Dale Johnson be
dismissed with prejudice.

Order of Judge Kenneth Rigtrup dated

May 9, 1986.
7.

Because all defendants that had been served summons

in this action had been dismissed, the Order of May 9, 1986
effectively dismissed this action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The only issue on appeal raised by the plaintiff was not
before the trial court.

In his appeal the plaintiff has not

addressed the merits of the lower court's decision to dismiss his
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

In his

docketing statement and appellate brief, the plaintiff's only

•2-

allegation is that the dismissal below of this action was the
fruit of a conspiracy between his private attorney, the judge and
defendants' counsel.
court below.
claim.

Such a claim was never presented to the

No evidence or record has been made concerning this

This Court should not address this issue of conspiracy but

should dismiss the appeal, leaving the plaintiff free to bring a
separate action if he so desires against the alleged conspirators.
The plaintiff seeks, in his complaint, damages from the
State of Utah and individual state officers for injuries he
received in a fire at the Utah State Prison where the plaintiff is
lawfully incarcerated.

The State of Utah has retained immunity

for injuries arising out of the incarceration of any person in a
state prison.

The State of Utah cannot be sued by the plaintiff

on this cause of action and the lower court correctly dismissed
this action as to the State of Utah and the Utah State Prison.
The individual state officers are entitled to a
statutory immunity unless they acted with fraud or malice. The
plaintiff at no time has alleged either fraud or malice, but only
negligence and gross negligence.

Construing the well plead

allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the complaint fails to state a cause of action for
fraud or malice against the individual state officers and the
lower court correctly dismissed this action as these defendants.

-'*-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF NEVER RAISED THE ISSUE OF A
CONSPIRACY IN THE TRIAL COURT AND CANNOT RAISE
THE ISSUE NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ON APPEAL
In his Appellate Brief, the plaintiff for the first time
seeks to present a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive the
plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

In his Brief, the

plaintiff alleges now that the plaintiff's own attorney, Mr, David
T. Berry, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup and the state defendants'
attorney, Brent A. Burnett joined with the named state defendants
in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff "of his property and
liberty interest rights to have his civil complaint heard and
argued in a state court of law.M

Appellants Brief at pp. 4-5.

At no time was this issue presented to the trial court.
It is clearly established law that claims not raised by the
parties in the trial court cannot be considered for the first time
on appeal.

Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697 P.2d 448 (Utah 1985);

Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984); L & M Corp. v.
Loader, 688 P.2d 448 (Utah 1984); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d
372 (Utah 1984); Allred v. Smith, 674 P.2d 99 (Utah 1983).

The

rationale for this rule of law was explained by this Court in
Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d
399 (1970).
The contention relating to strict liability is
an attempt to inject that doctrine into this
case for the first time on appeal. It was
dealt with neither in the plaintiff's
complaint, nor in the pretrial conference, nor
at trial. It is therefore not appropriate to
address such a contention to this court.
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the
-4-

final settlement of controversies, requires
that a party must present his entire case and
his theory or theories of recovery to the
trial court; and having done so, he cannot
thereafter change to some different theory and
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-goround of litigation.
Id at 401.
Not only does the plaintiff raise a new issue on appeal,
but he also would add three new defendants.

The question of a

conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his day in court was not
raised in the trial court at all.

No such claim was presented

before it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Such a claim

cannot now be considered by this Court.
In Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983),
this Court held that allegations of fraud and illegality first
presented on appeal would not be considered.

In Park City Utah

Corporation v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978) this
Court refused to reach a claim that a stipulation below had been
entered into by the defendant's attorney without the approval or
authorization of the defendant.

Because the issue had not been

addressed at any time before the trial court, this Court held that
it could not consider the issue for the first time on appeal.
Plaintiff's newly raised claim that his own attorney was
part of a conspiracy against the plaintiff falls within this rule
of law.

Such a claim cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.

If plaintiff desires, he may file a separate action

against those individuals he has proof have conspired to deny him
his constitutional rights.

The instant appeal is not the

appropriate time or manner in which to present this new cause of
action.

This Court is not equipped to inquire into such a claim.
-*-

To adjudicate this claim would require the taking of evidence, the
permitting of discovery? in short, it would require a trial court.
Because the only claim raised by the plaintiff on appeal is that
he has been the victim of a conspiracy, and he does not pursue the
original subject matter of the instant action, this appeal should
be dismissed and the plaintiff left free to bring a separate
action if he so desires concerning the allegation of a conspiracy.
POINT II
THE UTAH STATE PRISON IS IMMUNE AS A MATTER OF
LAW PURSUANT TO §63-30-10(1)(j) UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED
Plaintiff, on the day of the alleged accident, was an
inmate of the Utah State Prison.

All of the complained of actions

occurred while the plaintiff was incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act expressly retains the
State of Utah, and its agencies, immunity for any injury which
"arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison
...*.

§63-30-10(1)(j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended; previously

numbered as §63-30-10(10).
In Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), plaintiffs
sued the State of Utah for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's
decedent, a prison inmate.

The decedent died during surgery at

the Utah State Prison which plaintiffs alleged had been
negligently performed.

Affirming the dismissal of the State and

the Prison from the lawsuit, the Supreme Court of Utah relied upon
§63-30-10(10) Utah Code Ann. 1953, and explained.

-6-

The plain meaning of the section reflects a
legislative intent to retain sovereign
immunity for any injuries occurring while the
incarcerated person is in prison and under the
control of the State. Since this injury
occurred while Madsen was under the control of
prison officials, the governmental entities,
viz., the State of Utah and the Board of
Corrections, are both immune from liability.
583 P.2d at 93.
In Schmitt v. Billings, Utah, 600 P.2d 516 (1979), the
Court expressly held that the arising out of incarceration
exception applied to an inmate's claim that the Prison and its
employees had lost or damaged his property.

In Schmitt, the

plaintiff had alleged that certain of his personal property, while
in the possession of Prison employees, was lost.

The Court

affirmed the dismissal of the action as to the State of Utah, the
Utah State Prison, the Division of Corrections and the Department
of Social Services based on the legislative intent to retain
immunity for governmental entities for any injuries occurring
while the incarcerated person is in prison and under the control
of the State.
The statute has not been changed, only renumbered.

The

State of Utah and the Utah State Prison cannot be held liable in
the instant lawsuit, just as they could not be in Madsen v. State,
or Schmitt v, Billings, supra.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT STATE
EMPLOYEES
The plaintiff alleges that the individual defendant
state employees acted with gross negligence and, alternatively,
that they should be held strictly liable for the injuries

allegedly sustained by the plaintiff.

No allegation of fraud or

malice was made against these defendants in the complaint.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act contains a statutory
official immunity.

§63-30-4 Utah Code Ann. 1953r as amended.

The

fourth paragraph of §63-30-4, states:
An employee may be joined in an action against
a governmental entity in a representative
capacity if the act or omission complained of
is one for which the governmental entity may
be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of the
employees duties, within the scope of
employment or under color of authority, unless
it is established that the employee acted or
failed to act due to fraud or malice.
This statutory immunity was before this Court in Madsen
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).

Borthick, involved

allegations that the defendant state employee had negligently
caused plaintiff's fiscal losses.

In Borthick, the Court first

determined that the State of Utah, also a defendant, was immune.
This Court then held:
The second quoted paragraph of §63-30-4
reaffirms that the employee will not be
personally liable unless he or she acted or
failed to act due to gross negligence, fraud,
or malice. The second paragraph also
authorizes the employee to be joined in a
representative capacity in an action against
the governmental entity, but only where the
act or omission Mis one for which the
governmental entity may be liable* under the
Governmental Immunity Act. In other words,
the governmental official or employee can only
be sued in a representative capacity when the
governmental entity is liable.
The application of §63-30-4 of the
Governmental Immunity Act, as amended in 1978,
to the liability of defendant Borthick is
clear. He cannot be sued in his
representative capacity because the state is
-8-

not liable ... He cannot be sued in his
personal capacity because §63-30-4 precludes
personal liability of a government employee
for acts or omissions occurring during the
performance of his dutiesr unless the employee
••acted or failed to act through gross
negligence, fraud or malice.11 Since
plaintiff's complaint makes no such
allegations, its dismissal as to defendant
Borthick was proper.
658 P.2d at 633.
In the instant action the State of Utah and the Utah
State Prison are immune, as in Borthick.

Since Borthickf the

Legislature amended the statute by removing 'gross negligence'.
In the instant lawsuit, no allegation of fraud or malice has been
made such as would permit the plaintiff to recover from the
defendant.

At no time did the plaintiff seek to amend his

complaint so as to allege fraud or malice.

As in Borthick, the

instant claim should be dismissed.
Even if the plaintiff were to have amended his complaint
so as to allege fraud and malice; the allegations of the complaint
show affirmatively that no such mental state existed.
no facts to show 'fraud' in this action.

There are

'Malice' is defined as;

The intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse, with an intent
to inflict an injury or under circumstances
that the law will imply an evil intent. A
condition of mind which prompts a person to do
a wrongful act willfully, that is, on purpose,
to the injury of another, or to do
intentionally a wrongful act toward another
without justification or excuse. ...
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 862.
Malice implies an intentional act.

Negligence is not

sufficient to find that an act was done maliciously.

When

originally passed, S63-30-4 included liability of state employees
for gross negligence, fraud and malice.

-9-

To interpret the word

malice to mean anything other than an intentional act would be to
make the use of 'gross negligence' in the statute meaningless.
"Malice in law requires the willful doing of an
injurious wrongdoing of the part of Pentagon.11

Breuleux v.

Pentagon Federal Credit Union. 460 N.E.2d 306,309 (Ohio App.
1983),

The complaint failed to show any wrongdoing by the

defendants that could even arguably rise to the level of malice.
At most, the complaint might be read so as to support a
finding of gross negligence.

Gross negligence is defined as:

The intentional failure to perform a manifest
duty in reckless disregard of the consequences
as affecting the life or property of another.
It is materially more want of care than
constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an act
or omission respecting legal duty of an
aggravated character as distinguished from a
mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is
very great negligencef or the absence of
slight diligence, or the want of even scant
care.
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.r p. 931-932.
In the recent case of Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain
States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) , this Court accepted this
definition of gross negligence.
"Gross negligence is the failure to observe
even slight care; it is carelessness or
recklessness to a degree that shows utter
indifference to the consequences that may
result." Robinson Insurance and Real Estate#
Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.f 366
F.Supp. 307 f 311 (W.D.Ark. 1973). Willful
misconduct goes beyond gross negligence in
that a defendant must be aware that his
conduct will probably result in injury.
Id. at 335.
The plaintiff's complaint fails to state any facts or
allegations upon which a finding of fraud or malice could be
predicated.

There is no claim that the defendants actively sought
-10-

to injure the plaintiff.

There is no allegation that the

defendants in any manner showed malice to the plaintiff, nor did
they commit a fraud of any kind*

At most, the allegations of the

complaint when read most favorably to the plaintiff would show
that the defendants acted with a degree of carelessness and
indifference to the consequences of their actions that would
constitute gross negligence as that term has been defined by this
Court.

Under these circumstancesf the plaintiff, having alleged

nothing greater than gross negligence for which the defendants are
immuner has failed to state a cause of action against the
individual defendants and his complaint was correctly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed.
DATED this /S'

day of November, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Human Resources Division
If

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
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